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hello okay hi everyone thanks thanks for
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staying back i think i still see a lot of people i wasn't expecting that many people by this time but thank you for
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tuning up my name is Sasha and I'm going to talk about programming complexity
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today about modeling complex systems with Ruby and react so a few years ago I
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talked about something very similar and you've been to that top you can consider this to be a part 2 of the city hall but
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to begin with I just want to show this slide so Winston this is for you so this
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is the first post i did in 2006 right so when we first created the Singapore Ruby
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Brigade cuoco group and Chunkin was the one who created the group and is he is
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chuck it here or you left okay oh yeah right so he created the group
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and I quickly stripped him and conquered the first post so now you know what kind
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of friend I am right um anyway general a
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total of it by myself being the nasa since I am so my name is Sasha this is
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my email since how I can reach me and since we're down memory lane I have actually been to a number of radar ruby
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conference since 2001 so I've actually spoken since the first one till today
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except for 2014 oh so this is my fifth time here on the stage and I am totally
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overwhelmed by the emotions and not run believe he's kidding so i recently
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changed jobs so i was personally from paypal and i recently changed to join a
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utilities company so this is a company that is government-linked and provides
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power and gas and water to do a whole singapore so if you're interested to
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know why I make this really drastic change you can come and push me later on but anyway I have joined this company
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and their this I've been doing Ruby for a very long time I suppose 11 years now
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and counting so and along with journey I actually wrote three books and the most
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recent book however is one on go so that is that as well it's supposed to be
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released next month so if you're into web programming says my pitch for you to buy my book
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anyway so I think a number of people talked about really in-depth technical
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topics today and I just want to say that this is not one of them my presentation
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actually will show you no code but i do have coats so if you want to see it later you can actually go into this
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github repository and you can check out the code I can also show it to you if
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like enough you push out and clap I will show it to you on my text wait which is
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what i use anyway let me start with the the topic I want to talk about today
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basically I want to talk about complexity complexity what is it is not
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just about having systems that are very complicated and very difficult to understand this actually has a quite a
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definite term it is about the behavior that images from a group of interacting parts but it's not directly the result
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of interactions which in those individual parts basically something that comes out of individual parts but
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it doesn't look as if it is from those hearts let me just illustrate very
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quickly with a familiar example so you have seen like flocking Birds so each
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bird actually follow a very simple would say behavior they will just follow the
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bird in front of it you will try not to crash into the bird and we generally move in the direction that the bird is moving but the resultant a swarm of
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birds that you see it's something that is not what you expect from just the birds following a few simple rules in
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the same way a schooling group of fish has the same behavior so this this is
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what i mean by complexity certain behavior arising from things individual
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things that are happening that you don't expect and what I'm trying to do today in this talk is talk about
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certain types of complexity problems and those problems have really been model so
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what I'm going to talk about today is not something new all together some of it actually prio in fact as well as one
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topic time ago talk about is was actually written about before I was born so you can imagine how old it is let me
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jump into the first one so the first one I'm going to talk about is about modeling cultural interactions and since
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this is the year of Euro 2016 I just have to show you this picture anyone
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understand is as opposed to most people Hansen's so cultural interactions right
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so expectations and and how you would interpret them in terms of our culture
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some other examples like Mickey Mouse in Disneyland how many of you have jeep
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into the disneyland in tokyo if you
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notice that Mickey Mouse actually speaks in Japanese and Donald up and everybody
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else like so it was totally mind-blowing for me when i was there starbucks in
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beijing in the Forbidden City Chinese food in America yoga I and also this
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monstrosity I don't really know what to call it but apparently it's called pizza
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so I think what I'm trying to show here is that culture do interact with each other and strange things happen
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subsequently and somebody actually wrote something about it in 1997 American
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political scientist his name is Robert Axelrod so I actually did some simulations based on his work in a
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previous talk what he did was I mean he's also a complexity to research her
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and national medal of science laureate so he's someone important and someone
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really really smart so he actually built a model based on two assumptions a model of cultural interactions based on two
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assumptions the first is that people are more likely to yeah similar to each other are more
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likely to interact and when cultures interact with each other they become
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more alike each other so I made everything back a little bit about the few examples I show you just now yeah
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some other examples so what I'm going to do is I'm going to build a an agent-based model where each agent
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represented culture and then I'm going to just roll them into into this experiment and I'm gonna run and we're
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going to see what happens right so let's look at the experiment i define culture
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as a set of features excuse me the features meaning like language religion
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the way that you dress the kind of food you eat and so on and so forth and
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within each feature there are a set of possible trades so trade is a possible
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values of a particular feature and then i model the cultures in a 36 x discreet
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where each cell represents a culture so each cell represents a culture and each
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culture has six features and each feature has 16 possible trades right so
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question is why did I choose 6 and 16
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what do you think
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yes no not at all in this group Thank You team so it's a lazy man's way
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of representing the the model basically i used the colors right so hex color
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code so red green and blue so six values and each one of these I have 16 possible
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traits and so the simulation goes this way I have for every culture there they
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have eight possible neighbors unless you're in a border or the corner and algorithm goes this way everything I
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randomly pick n number of cells and I will compare the features of the culture with each of the neighbors if they trade
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difference for the same feature within two cultures is less than T then I will
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randomly copy the trait of the feature to the other culture a lot of works let me just show them to you in more visual
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way so let's say a and B are two neighboring cultures and culture a has
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this particular value culture be at this particular value I think each of the trade and compare them so in this case I
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think the trade in a tree right in South tree and I compare them the difference
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is true and do that for every single one of them and then I Adam it all up and
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the difference between these two cultures become 34 right now of course if they are totally different then the
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difference is 96 and if they are totally the same culture there is no difference
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is 0 so the more similar the two cultures are the more likely they will be culture exchange therefore the
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probability of this culture exchange is 1 minus difference between the two cultures dy by 96 simple arithmetic
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calculate the probability in this case for that particular example and when the
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interaction do happens I copy one trip to the other and therefore as you can see here um one trade sorry one culture
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influences the other one trade is copied from one to the other and therefore something changes right there's an
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interaction so what do you want to measure here so we actually run a simulation what do you want to measure
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so in particular I want to run I want to measure three things the first
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is the average feature distance this tells us how different each culture are
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from each other at the end of each simulation each round of simulation the uniques tell us how many unique cultures
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are at they are at any given point in time and lastly the changes tell us how
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vibrant the cultural exchanges are right so I want to measure this tree particular points for the simulation and
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I would just very quickly run the simulation so i'm going to use puma
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we'll run the assimilation okay so is this life by the way so let
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me just show you so I'm going to start the simulation you see from the chart on
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the chart on the left you have blue which is the distance between the average distance between two cultures
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and red is the number of changes and yellow is the number of uniques right um
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you see over time the average distance reduces so over time you see as
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experiment goes the differences we needed cultures actually reduced the number of UNIX also reduced because as
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time goes by culture has become more and more like each other and finally you can
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see that the differences for the changes there is always changed right and you
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can see it here on the nicely kind of changing colors that you see that they
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are so then big blotches of particular color that means basically a culture has
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dominated that particular simulation right and what time you see that it
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doesn't remain constant some parts of it turn greens understand the yellow and
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other parts of it turned blue and I'm going to stop the this for now get back to the slides
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oops okay so this is a simulation and
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over a period of time because I'm going to run the entire simulation to the presentation but over time this is
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roughly where you get the yellows which represent the number of UNIX actually
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dropped to a particular constant the changes remain the same and the distance actually do not drop down to zero right
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or doesn't actually drop below the number of uniques so let's let's look at some observations now again as I say
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this is a simulation I didn't actually plan any of this and this are just observations from the simulation
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eventual equilibrium is that there are a few dominant cultures that's also to be
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expected so as cultures cultures interact with each other our one will eventually dominate the dominant
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cultures can be quite different from each other so we look that colors can be very different from each other so if I
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actually reduce the number this the area I use a 36 x 36 screen because it looks
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pretty but I could use a smaller one or could use a bigger one small errors results in faster equilibrium and
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smaller number of culture so you have a smallest geographic space you would expect that there's actually more
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changes and there are fewer dominant cultures but I suppose one thing that I
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didn't really expect in the end which I I observe here is that a culture that is
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more dominant at one point time doesn't mean he would be dominant in the end like so and dominant cultures doesn't
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mean one culture basic dominant theater basically in the end is not not when two
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couches interact they form actually form a separate culture subculture disgrace on to and that's the one that becomes
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dominant so in a way that's a simulation of how cultures interact if you want to
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make more observations or you want to try various please feel free to take the code this one github so now that's
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culture let me talk about another simulation about racial segregation
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singapore's are really where I mean for those visitors here and you realize
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Singapore is actually very racially diverse there's a lot of diversity here so adding racial segregation is
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something that's important in Singapore and increasingly around the world you probably notice that you know as as
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different people move into other countries and so on segregation of
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people of different races or different cultures and background become increasingly important so I think this
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is a interesting model but again tikka be the pinch of salt this is a computer simulation model this is not a
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reflection of your life yeah so um in two thousand cattle graphic called go
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Rankin what I did was he did a he took map and he basically took every like 25
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people over the nape and then he would put a color to the race of that person of those people and he created a map and
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what came out was quite startling you see that you blotches of blue pink and
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orange and they represent the different races in in Chicago so very obviously
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there is some kind of rich racial segregation sometimes at very sharp
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edges you will look at the blues and and oranges says sometimes just a dividing
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line to it so that's that's pretty stock is it only Chicago probably not so other
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cities in in us were also i mean the same things happen in other cities and
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same things were done for other cities and this came out as a result and in
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detroit i think that seems pretty serious is like blue and pink New York
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LA washington DC some other countries around the world will also miss some
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other cities around the world also used and London also showed something
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very similar so the question comes is like why is there such segregation London is supposed to be one of the most
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racially diverse cities in the world like so what is really happening is it
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inevitable is segregation inevitable so Thomas Schelling is like America
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economists 2005 nobel memorial prize in economic sciences I made a mistake of
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saying that this the Thomas Schelling won the Nobel Prize for economics once I had gotten really bashed up quite a lot
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so we were careful to say that he actually won the nobel memorial prize in economic sciences so he wrote his paper
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in 1971 called the dynamic models of segregation where I did a simulation on
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how races were being segregated I the way that he did it it's very different
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from the way that I'm gonna use today because what he did was basically use a grid of chopped I chop chop by Jove
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coins and then he flipped the coins right whenever there's some interaction what I'm going to do today is absolutely
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not that I'm not going to use coins I have computers to help me so I'm going to do a simulation and we're just
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exactly the same model that I used early on 36 x 36 grid paint neighbors each but
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i'll go ahead and slightly different now at everything i will check every cell instead of random set of cells if at
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least n number of his neighbors are the same race I wouldn't do anything right so imagine every household occupies one
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cell and if I find that the races around me are of a blur that my neighbors out
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of the same race I won't do anything but if they are more racist / say that a
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certain threshold there are more neighbors who are different race than I am then I would try to find somewhere
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else to move to or pick an empty cell and I move there so what are the parameters I'm going to
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measure and that I'm going to use to sort of do the simulation so first it's
00:19:08.590
acceptable number of neighbors which means like more neighbors the larger the
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n is the more acceptable i am 22 I'm
00:19:21.130
actually okay with living with a diverse neighborhood the second one is the
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number of races and the grid so I was out of with two but as you see I will increase the number of races in the
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world grid then the percentage awaken cells of course you've got zero waken cells basically I can't move anywhere
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therefore it's kind of useless simulation but if I increase the
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percentage of vacant cells does that help is it better if it's more spacious would there be more segregation
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otherwise so that's one of the parameter sampling wave and lastly i use a policy
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limitation so this has been used in many countries where you say that certain percentage of a particular area cannot
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have like a majority or certain race or so on so that's policy limitation I want
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to also simulate to see whether is that useful is that something that would be helpful to reduce segregation so let me
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run the simulation here
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well well this is finishing you can see the dominant races here just now the
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dominant cultures here so let me go here
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so I set the example number of neighbors to be to number races to 20 percentage
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cells are vacant and the courts are here basically the policy is 8 so we set up
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again is randomly assigned what I'll do is I'll start the simulation and as you
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can see the simulation quickly becomes segregated like so with this particular
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set of parameters it becomes aggregate quickly so let me just increase the
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acceptable number of neighbors set up again so you see early on that actually
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large areas where there are people are segregated that's the son of simulation again okay maybe it's just too much yeah
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okay let me just reduce it district let's do that again again you see
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segregation but you know this is something different now it's a it's even bigger blotches and as you saw earlier
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on as I increase teen acceptable number of neighbors and they started again
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something strange happens it keeps moving it doesn't actually stabilize right it doesn't actually come to a
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steady state so that tells us certain things as well so again I can change the number of races here
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in syrup okay this is called you're wrong number
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to use case set up and again you can see that there's
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actually segregation with the races right in this stabilizes if I go up to
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forward it actually does not save the lines so 24 you will go into a
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continuous loop okay let me get back to the slides
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I'm not going to fight right it's okay
00:22:42.100
okay so talk about that just now simulation again my observations and as
00:22:48.669
as I mentioned earlier on you can take the same code that I used and play around with it feel free to just walk
00:22:55.720
around with it and try out your own simulations so segregation happens even
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there is a week preference for neighbors of the same time so even if I'm very acceptable to having neighbors of
00:23:07.870
different races segregation happens the weaker the preference though the last
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aggregator would be so if I'm I am ok with diverse different kind of neighbors
00:23:20.679
then the clusters becomes smaller which is good news basically we are saying that the less racist via ha then the
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less segregated we will be which is the good news first overall the stronger
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preference the most a greater that's the opposite of what I said early on at a particular trash show though the strong
00:23:43.030
preferences we saw in an unstable but non-segregated state so it's good it's
00:23:48.070
good as nothing yet but at the same time people keep moving so that's no good that basically means is the chaos right
00:23:53.950
the where were the city is in the chaos the province of state whatever it is is
00:23:59.110
in constant move the number of races have no impact to segregation this is a
00:24:05.890
little bit surprising but you have two
00:24:11.500
different races you were segregated to klum's you have ten different races you just said look into 10 different clumps
00:24:18.260
and the number of weaken cells have no impact this occasion the larger the area is the more we can the city's there has
00:24:25.280
no particular impact you will still be segregated and lastly policy and for
00:24:31.730
sermon has limited impact on segregation so it does have certain impact because
00:24:37.610
you do get people to not be so segregated but at the same time if you
00:24:44.300
impose policy that are too strong what happens is that evil will result in an
00:24:49.970
unstable state again undesirable now what is whether the solution do is I
00:24:55.250
have no solution I'm just running a simulation right so I think this takes a simulation try it out and see what
00:25:01.760
happens okay so I've done two simulations now I'm going to switch
00:25:06.920
gears a little bit to something slightly different I'm going to model something called the bystander effect so this is a
00:25:13.910
very famous case um in 1964 a 19 year
00:25:21.230
old girl called kitty Genovese scene in New York recently graduated from high
00:25:27.020
school she was working in a bar and she was walking home and she was attacked by an intruder and what happened was she
00:25:32.930
was actually attacked a couple of times and it was is not in bright daylight but
00:25:38.240
it was close enough to an apartment block and apparently at least from his sensationalist headlines you say that 37
00:25:45.470
people saw the murder but didn't do anything about it so there was like a big wake-up call for a lot of people say
00:25:51.560
what's happening to this world I'll be so in so desensitized to violence that
00:25:56.960
we no longer care about people around this and that was in 1964 in october two
00:26:03.860
thousand one in fossa in china to yo
00:26:10.430
girl was hit by a white man and then run over by a truck again and
00:26:16.269
she was basically not helped by any bystander until about I mean like a
00:26:22.359
large group of people basically not her until after a while until she was actually rescued a quite a while later
00:26:29.249
unfortunately she passed away as a result of that so again there's another example of what certain people call the
00:26:36.070
bystander effect and the bites and the effect is something that's been talked
00:26:42.820
about in game theory so this is the next thing that I'm gonna model game theory is a study of medical medical models so
00:26:50.259
it's mathematics more mathematics here within conflict and cooperation and is using kannamma in political science and
00:26:57.089
it's an example i will use for complexity science as well so the particular topic is what is called
00:27:04.539
volunteers dilemma basically if there's a large group of people witnessing
00:27:10.029
something and if he or she does he or she volunteer or not because there is a
00:27:17.049
cost of volunteering and there's a cost of not volunteering right so modeling that in with mathematics you have
00:27:25.709
variables your V which is a value gain if at least one person volunteers which
00:27:30.789
means like if somebody actually volunteer and shout and say stop stop
00:27:36.129
their murder or whatever T for rubber or whatever then that act would have been stopped but at the same time individual
00:27:43.359
cost of volunteering for volunteer maybe it's except their time maybe cause attention to them and therefore they
00:27:49.779
will be attacked instead of for the other person and of course there's overall cost is no one volunteers so what's what's the cost of that when no
00:27:57.039
modern volunteers in which case we saw earlier just now people actually died when the one volunteer so it is actually
00:28:02.409
a tragedy so um game theory actually has
00:28:07.989
something called a payoff matrix while the payoff matrix for those cases our
00:28:13.869
show just now is much larger let's just start off we have a two player game right if you and me and in the case of say so
00:28:25.270
you have you and me and you form a matrix where I volunteer or you volunteer in cases where I want I
00:28:35.440
volunteer and you volunteer or you don't volunteer it seems to be the same there doesn't seem to be any difference if I
00:28:42.700
don't volunteer whether you volunteer you don't volunteer there's a difference like so veem and B minus a so using this
00:28:50.880
payoff matrix we come up with something called a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium which is actually the best case for the
00:28:58.120
game theory so we have this equation V minus C equals to the P P is the
00:29:04.000
probability of volunteering multiplied by V class and so on and so forth so with this particular equation we change
00:29:13.120
it to an N player game so instead of having just two players and change to n player and the probability of
00:29:18.790
volunteering becomes n minus 1 so instead of P becomes P to the power n minus 1 right and therefore the
00:29:26.320
probability of non volunteering is 1-3 to the power n minus 1 because we put everything together you come up with
00:29:32.020
this particular formula and then you derive it you get into a final formula
00:29:38.470
right so that's the mathematics part of it what I do with this particular probability then I run some multicolored
00:29:46.780
simulation on it and i'll show you the the model
00:29:55.059
not still going on you all right so this is the volunteers dilemma so the x axis
00:30:06.279
is the number of agents basically number of players are number of witnesses or what have you not and the y-axis is the
00:30:13.749
probability of volunteering right weather is it likely that somebody would volunteer and say something about it
00:30:18.879
right so let's look at increasing or decreasing the cost of volunteering so
00:30:25.509
if I decrease the cost of water to ring naturally we would realize that okay is
00:30:31.480
less costly to volunteer therefore more people want and as you can see that that's true right because avis becomes
00:30:42.460
trivial for me to volunteer then there will be more people volunteering right
00:30:47.850
and of course if the cost of volunteering is larger than the overall
00:30:53.499
cost then there's nobody who volunteer now let's look at it their way around the world cause of volunteering if the
00:31:01.840
overall cost of voluntary if I don't volunteer and do something then there will be total disaster if I don't shout
00:31:10.090
fire when there's a fire the whole block burns down everybody dies right so
00:31:15.100
that's the worst case possible so if i increase the cost of volunteering of not volunteering then basically what happens
00:31:24.490
is that of course the likelihood or somebody ball entering here increases as well
00:31:30.509
so you can see something interesting though as I assure this particular model
00:31:36.229
at the start the probability of with the
00:31:41.570
three agents with three players the probability of volunteering is sixty-two percent as the number of agents
00:31:48.089
increases the probability of volunteering actually decreases so we
00:31:53.759
sort of reflect back to the example that I gave just now kitty genovese see so if
00:32:01.199
there was actually just one person witnessing the murder then the probably of that person actually shouting out and
00:32:08.819
are really scaring off the attacker might be a lot higher than say there
00:32:13.829
were 37 people right so you can see that that big model here so let's look at the the last piece that I wanted to the last
00:32:22.169
parameter that I wanted to tomorrow increasing the number of agents
00:32:30.410
do you realize what's happened here doesn t matter how many agents they are
00:32:36.920
the probability is just the same it doesn't mean that the more people when this is something then the more likely
00:32:42.920
somebody will shout out loud yeah this that's not the case now what does this tell us well let me get back to the
00:32:49.700
slides again I'm just running a
00:32:54.860
simulation I'm not telling you what happens you decide I mean this is a simulation it's not a real life
00:33:01.720
observations what can we do so first of all we need to decrease the cause of
00:33:07.100
volunteering if you don't want such strategies tragedies to happen we should decrease the cost of volunteering make
00:33:13.160
it easier for people to volunteer increase the world casa or impaired normal and drink of course we don't
00:33:19.430
really want that right you don't want to make things worse if nobody volunteers but nonetheless that is a way of
00:33:24.880
increasing the probability of symbolic voluntary volunteering you notice again
00:33:30.680
is actually not really about the exact number the absolute numbers but it's the difference between the individual costs
00:33:36.500
and the world costs so maybe the answer is relate to while you reduce the overall cost but you also making such a
00:33:43.370
difference between the individual costs and the workhorse up very high right
00:33:48.670
this is a bit counter interact intuitive because you reduce the number of players
00:33:54.350
a number of agents basically what happens is there is likelihood of
00:33:59.690
probability the probability of voluntary increases so that's that's maybe what should happen not necessarily for a an
00:34:08.360
accident in such case it's um it's possible because just so many people
00:34:13.640
there but maybe there are other ways or maybe anonymously volunteering Mike so that could be a way of doing something
00:34:19.000
to reduce the number of players and finally the observation here is that
00:34:24.280
increasing the number of players have negative or even have no impact or even a negative impact on the overall
00:34:31.440
probability of volunteering think so hope you guys have still with me Yeah
00:34:38.139
right I actually come to the end of the that is talk however has been
00:34:43.990
interesting for you if you want to you can actually take a look at the github
00:34:49.690
repository I have this here just feel free to play around with it and you have
00:34:55.179
any sort of questions please feel free to ask so thank you thank you very much
00:35:06.550
young anyone would anyone like to post crushed a father okay
00:35:19.580
their switch here oh okay yeah um you said if we shouted and screamed you'd
00:35:25.580
show us a bit of the code so i thought i'd ask this question you showed
00:35:32.050
basically three different simulations and i'm wondering what commonalities
00:35:39.800
underline the code maybe that would be an interesting way to show off the code
00:35:46.010
what do you think oh I can show you you don't need to shout actually um thank
00:35:53.630
you the previous slide so mmm basically
00:35:59.960
this is I just I you seen otra because it's simple enough right see now try and
00:36:06.290
JSON and equate to eight different simulations here the first one is the culture simulation and uses a grid so
00:36:14.800
great simple is quite simple kind of algorithm culture i use a combination of
00:36:25.820
the bit mask to sort of make it to tell differences and some very simple items
00:36:33.650
to just find the distance between the two diff two different numbers and so on no man I didn't want to show it because
00:36:40.760
it's not very sexy know who know very complicated right it just so simple
00:36:46.480
simple code is sexy thank you I wasn't
00:36:53.000
fishing for it by the way um yeah so
00:36:58.730
hope that it's okay
00:37:04.240
okay thank you regarding the Bonne terres dilemma where it is personal
00:37:10.060
choice freedom of thought come in in terms of attitudes of so I think
00:37:17.020
definitely those things do count except that this is a magic medical model so it
00:37:24.040
basically models large group of people something like psychohistory you guys
00:37:29.170
realize them off no nevermind but it is status a status that code status
00:37:36.070
tactical whatever sabatham ethical modeling so yeah individual will does
00:37:43.660
count by ring in this case I didn't put at it into the model okay thank you very
00:37:52.810
much Sasha thank you